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The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Floral attempts to balance legitimate trade inter-
ests in renewable natural resources wizh the need to protect enjan-
gered species.2 The agreement contains a series of reservation
clauses, which allows member states to opt out of protecting any spe-
cies covered by the treaty.3 As a result of these clauses, commercial
exploitation continues to threaten endangered species.4 The prob-
lem is aggravated by the lucrative market for wildlife products.5
I. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, done July I, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087. T.I.A.S. No. 8249 [hereinafter cited as Conven-
tion]. For the legislative history of the Convention, see PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES. MESSAGE TO THE SENATE TRANSMITTING THE CONVENTION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA. S. EXEC. H 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); 68 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 613 (1973).
2. See Convention, supra note I. preamble (discussing international trade and the
economic value of wild fauna and flora, while also recognizing the need to protect species
from overexploitation); Speech by Lee M. Talbot. Director General of the International
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN):
As viewed by IUCN, [the Convention] is neither [a preservationist convention
nor a traders' convention] exclusively, it is a conservation convention which
through the regulation of trade seeks to'avoid the loss of species and to assure the
sustainability of the yield of benefits from wild flora and fauna to present and
future generations. --
Reprinted in Secretariat of the Convention [on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora], Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the Conference of
the Parties, Inf. 3.5, at 4 (New Delhi, India, Feb. 25-March 8; 1981) [hereinafter cited as
New Delhi Proceedings] (copy of U.S. delegation's unofficial copy on file at Cornell Inter-
national Law Journal); Sand, Stop this Shameful Traffic, NATUR6t'A 56, 57 (No. 34/35,
1980) (Council of Europe). Mr. Sand, of the IUCN, is the secretary general of the Con-
vention's secretariat. [19801 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Current Rep.) 25. The IUCN
operates the secretariat on behalf of the executive director of the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme. Convention, supra note 1, art. XII(I); Sand, supra, at 56.
3. See text accompanying notes 45-73 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 74-82 & 101-10 infra.
5. Dr. Arrd Wunschmann, Director of Munich's Hellabrunn Zoo, has stated that
"the illegal trade in furs, trophies and protected animals now has higher profit margins
than the drug traffic." Sand,. wpra note 2, at 57. Moreover, the wildlife smuggler has less
chance of getting caught than a narcotics dealer, and fines and prison sentenc& are "woe-
fully inadequate." Id at 58; letter from David Mack, Assistant Director, TRAFFIC
(U.S.A.), to Stephen Yale-Lochr, at 1 (April 3, 1981) (on file at Cornell International Law
Journal). TRAFFIC stands for Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Com-
merce.
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This Note examines the problems arising from the Convention's
reservation clause system. Section I discusses the agreement's his-
tory and stnacture, focusing on the reservation clauses. Section 11
examines the effect of multiple reservations and trade between a
reserving party and a nonmember on the saltwater crocodile and sea
turtle species. The Note concludes with proposals to limit abuse of
the reservation clauses. 6
THE CONVENTION
A. HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION
In the early 1960's, nations and concerned groups began to mus-
ter support for an international convention to regulate trade in
endangered species. They recognized that existing international
agreements focusing solely on national conservation measures were
insufficient.' In 1963, the Eighth General Assembly of the Interna-
tional Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN) resolved to draft a treaty on the problem.8 The IUCN circu-
lated two formal drafts for comments by member governments in
1967 and 1969;" Kenya and the United States also prepared drafts.'0
These documents were combined into a unified working paper,
which formed the basis of the 1973 Washington Plenipotentiary
Conference to Conclude and International Convention on Trade in.
Certain Species of Wildlife."
B. STRUCTURE OF THE CONVENTION
The Convention attempts to protect endangered species by reg-
ulating international trade through a system of export and import
C Trts Note defines "endangered species" as those species *'threatened with extinc-
uion." See Con',ention. supra note I. art. 11(i). The Convention also protects species that
.a.lthough not necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in
,pecamens of such species is subject to strict regu!ation.'' Id art. 1l(2)(a). For analogous
detinitions of *endangered" and "'threatened'" in U.S. legislation. see note 91 infra.
" See Legislative Development; Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wlid Fauna and Flora. 6 L. & POL'y Bus, i 211. 1217 (1974) [hereinafter citcd
as Legislati e Development]; New Delhi Proceedings. supra note 2. Inf. 3.5. at 3: 68
Di-P'T STATE BULL. 613. 615 (1973).
8 2 IUCN BULL. (new ser.) 162 (1971).
9 68 DP'T STATE BULL. 613. 615 (1973).
10 Id For a critical review of these early drafts, see Note. Commentary Upon the
l UCY Drafi Convention on the Export. Import and Transit of Certain Species of Wild
14mimals and Plants/. 21 C,%TI, U.L. REv. 665 (1972).
II 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 613. 615 (1973).
As of March 1981, 67 states were parties to the Conser tion, New Delhi Proceedings.
supra note 2. Plen. 3.2. at 2
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permits.' 2 The three Appendices list the various species covered
under the Convention.' 3 Each appendix indicates the degree of
trade regulation, and thus the degree of protection, afforded that spe-
cies. Appendix I lists all species threatened with extinction that are,
or may be, affected by trade) t4  The Convention strictly controls
trade in Appendix I specimens,' 5 allowing it only if both the import-
ing and exporting states issue permits.' 6 The importing state must
make three determinations before issuing an import permit to the
trader. It must determine that the import will not be detrimental to
wild populations of the species, that the recipient of a living speci-
men is suitably equipped to care for it,II and, most importantly, that
the specimen will not be used primarily for commercial purposes.' 8
An exporting state must determine that the importing state
issued an import permit before it may issue an export permit. In
addition, the exporting state must determine that the specimen's
export will not be detrimental to the survival of the species, that the
specimen was not obtained "in contravention of the laws of that
State for the protection of fauna and flora," and that living speci-
mens will be transported safely.' 9
12. For purposes of the Convention. "species" is defined to mean "any species, sub-
species, or geographically separate population thereof." Convention, supra note I. art.
l(a). "This definition permits geographically isolated populations to be protected regard-
less of the worldwide status occupied by the remainder of the species." Legislative
Development, sapra note 7. at 1219 (footnote omitted).
The Convention defines "'trade" to mean "export, re-export, import, and introduction
from the sea." Convention. supra note I. art. I(c). The last phrase is defined as "trans-
portation into a State of specimens of any species which were taken in the marine envi-
ronment not under the jurisdiction of any State." Id an. 1(e). "Re-export" means
"export of any specimen that has previously been imported." Id art. I(d).
13. Article II specifies the general categories of species and subspecies to be listed in
,ach appendix. Appendix IV sets forth a model export permit.
14. Convention. supra note 1. art. II(I).
15. The treaty defines "'specimen" as any animal or plant. whether dead or alive, and
any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof. Id art. I(b). Derivatives include
such items as fur coats and alligator-skin handbags. 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 616 (1973).
The scope of the term "specimen" was the focus of some controversy at the Plenipoten-
tiary Conference. States favoring wide application of the Convention urged coverage for
all derivative parts of the listed species without the requirement of placing such parts in
the appendices. Other states favored limiting the term to primary products and those
denvatives specifically listed in the appendices. The Convention reflects a compromise:
readily recognizable parts or derivatives of Appendix I plants and Appendix I and 11
animals need not be specifically listed to receive protection; however, readily recogniza-
ble parts or derivatives of Appendix II & Ill plants and Appendix II1 animals must be
listed. Convention. supra note I. art. I(b); 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 613, 616 (1973).
16. Convention, supra note I. arts. 111(2), (3).
17. Id art. llI(3)(a). (3)(b).
18. Id art. lI1(3)(c).
19. Id art. 111(2). Similar requirements are imposed on re-exports and specimens
introduced from the sea. Id art. 111(4). (5).
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Appendix II includes species that, although not presently
threatened with extinction, may become so unless their trade is
strictly regulated. 20 The Convention does not require an import per-
mit for either the importation of Appendix II species or as a prereq-
uisite for the acquisition of an export permit. In other respects, the
requirements for an Appendix It export permit are similar to those
for an Appendix I export permit. 21 Unlike Appendix I species, par-
ties may use Appendix II species for commercial purposes. 22
Appendix III includes all species that individual parties have
regulated within their own jurisdictions whose protection requires
the cooperation of other parties. 23 The Convention requires an
export permit for Appendix III species only when the export is from
a state that has included that species on its Appendix Ill list.24 In
order to import an Appendix III specimen, the importer must pres-
ent only a certificate of origin, an export permit, or a re-export certif-
icate. 2'
The Convention's drafters listed over 1500 species of plants and
animals: the parties have added more by amendment since then. 2 .
While the Convention text fails to define the scope of the term
'amendment," the report of the U.S. delegation to the Plenipotenti-
20 Id art ll(2)(a) Appendix 11 also encompasses other species that must be regu-
laed to facilitate effective trade controls on the potentially threatened species. id art.
1112)(b)
21 Id art. IV(2j. The requirements for re-export and introduction from the sea of
Appendix I1 specimens arc less strngent than for Appendix I specimens. Compare id
art IV5). (6) IAppendix 11 species) with id art. 111(4). (5) (Appendix I species).
22 Compare id art. IV(4) with id art. 11](3)(c).-
23 Id an 1(3). Since Appendix III is composed of species identified by individual
partics rather than by mass party agreement. no Appendix Ill is included in the original
text of the Convention. 27 U.S.T. 1087. 1091 n.I.
24 Convent.on.supra note 1. ait. V(2). If an export permit is required. the exporting
state must determine that the specimen was not obtained illegally and that living speci-
mens %%ill be transported safely. Id
25 Id art. V(3). (4). The Convention is to be implemented on a national level. Id
art VItIi l). For discussion of implementing legislation enacted by the United States. see
text accompanying notes 90-96 mfra. The Convention directs parties to take appropriate
measures to prohibit trade in specimens in violation of the treaty. Convention, supra
note I. art. VIII(l). These domestic measures may be stricter than the Convention's pro-
',isions. Id art. XIV(I). Each party must maintain trade records of specimens covered
b) the Convention, id art. VIII(6). and submit reports of such information as well as of
other enforcement measures instituted to the secretariat. Id art. VIII(7). The parties
must also set up a management authority to grant permits and a scientific authority to
advise the management authority on the possible detrimexijal effects of import or export.
Id arts. lll(2Xa). (3){a-b), (5Xa). IV(2Xa). (3). (5Xb). (6 Xa). IX(l).
26 New Delhi Proceedings. supra note 2. Doc. 3.31. 1 Secretariat of the Convention
[on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Floral, Proceedings
of the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties 69-76 (San Jose Costa Rica.
March 19-30. 1979) [hereinafter cited as San Jos6 Proceedings) (on file at Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal); Wasserman, Washington Wildl#e Convention. 4 J. WORLD TRADE L.
362. 363 (1980); Legislative Development, supra note 7. at 1212. 1220.
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ary Conference indicates that, in addition to adding and subtracting
species, the term encompasses shifting a species from one appendix
to another.27 Two procedures exist for amending Appendices I and
II. One method allows members to vote on amendments at the bien-
nial conference of the parties. Each amendment must pass by a two-
thirds majority of the parties present and voting.28 A second method
enables parties to initiate amendments between conferences by sub-
mitting proposed revisions to the secretariat. 29 The secretariat trans-
mits the proposal to all the parties and later circulates comments by
parties. as well as its own recommendations. 30  If the secretariat
receives no objections within thirty days, the parties adopt the
amendment.3 An objection by a party, however, triggers a postal
vote: two-thirds of the parties must then cast affirmative votes to
adopt the amendment. 32 Under either procedure, amendments to
Appendices I and II enter into force ninety days after adoption
(except vis-a-vis those parties that submit written reservations to the
revisions within the ninety day period). 33
To amend the ConventioA-.s text, the secretariat must convene
an extraordinary meeting of the parties.34 A two-thirds majority of
those parties present and voting is required to adopt a textual
amendment.35 The amendment enters into effect for the parties that
accept it sixty days after two-thirds of the parties ratify it. 3 To date,
27. 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 613. 617 (1973).
28. Convention. supra note I. art. XV(I)(a-b). The Convention provides for a regu-
lar *'meeting of the Conference of the Parties" at least once every two years after the
entry into force of the Convention. Id art. XI(I), (2). Conference meetings have been
held in 1976 (-erne. Switzerland). 1979 (San Jose, Costa Rica). and 1981 (New Delhi,
India). New Delhi Proceedings. note 2supra: I San Jost Proceedings, supra note 26. at 3.
The second meeting of the conference of the parties was delayed until 1979 because of a
special working session of the parties held in Geneva in 1977. Id
29. Convention, supra note I, art. XV(2).
30 Id
31. Id art. XV(2)(f).
32. Id. art. XV(2)(g-j). For discussion of the objection/no objection distinction in
this procedure, see 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 613. 617 (1973).
33. Id art. XV(3). For a discussion of the Convention's reservation clause system.
see text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
A state may alter its Appendix III list by informing the secretariat of the changes
desired. Convention, supra note 1. art. XVI. The secretaiat then communicates this
information to the parties. Id art. XVI(2). (3). Deletions from the appendix take effect
30 days after communication; additions become effective 90 days after communication.
Id A party may enter a written reservation to an Appendix III species at any time. Id
art. XVI(2).
34. Id art. XVII(l). The secretariat is to convene an "extraordinary meeting" at any
time on the written request of at least one-third of the parties. Id arts. XI(2). XVII(l).
35. Id art. XVII(1).
36. Id art. XVII(3).
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this unwieldy procedure has only been used once.
3 7
The parties also have the option of "modifying" the Convention
informally, through recommendations and decisions. Recommenda-
tions are designed to improve the effectiveness of the Convention;38
examples include a recommendation on illegal trade in Appendix II
and III species 9 and criteria for the review of Appendix I and II
wildlife species native to individual parties.40 Decisions are criteria
or standards used to guide members, as well as the secretariat, in
administrative and procedural implementation of the treaty. 4' Both
recommendations and decisions are methods exhibiting flexibility
and informality; the parties may adopt either one by consensus or
majority vote.
4 2
However, they are unenforceable and add only an advisory
gloss to the Convention.4 3 At most, recommendations and decisions
represent a statement by the parties that they will attempt in good
faith to meet the statement's objectives expressed therein.44
C. THE RESERVATION CLAUSES
The Convention allows a state to opt out of extending protec-
tion to a species.45 These "reservations" may take three forms.
First, a party may enter a reservation when it joins the Convention. 6
This reservation will exist until the party decides to withdraw it.47
Second, a party may make a reservation to an amendment to Appen-
dices I or 11 within ninety days of the amendment's adoption.4 8
37. Interviews with Joan Anthony. Chief. Management Operations Branch of Fed-
eral Wildlife Permit Office. U.S. Dep't of Interior (Feb. 19. 26. March il. April 10, 16,
20. 1981)
38 Conention. supra note 1. art. XI(3Xe).
39 1 San Jost Proceedings. supra note 26. at 123-24, 186-87.
40. See 43 Fed. Reg. 55.314 (1978),
41. The secretariat has implied this definition from articles XI(3)(a) and XI(5) of the
treato. See i San Jose Proceedings. supra note 26. at 1121 (Doc. 2.36. adopted by the
parties in I San Jost Proceedings. supra note 26. at 173).
42 Id
43 Interviews with Joan Anthony. note 37 supra.
44. Id
45. Convention, supra note 1. arts. XV(3). XVI(2). XXIII.
46 Id art. XXIII(2). The article provides in pertinent part:
2. Any State may. on depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance.
approval or accession, enter a specific reservation with regard to:
(a) any species included in Appendix I. II or III: or
(b) any parts or derivatives specified in relation to a species included in
Appendix Il1.
3. Until a Party withdraws its reservation entered under the provisions of this
Anicle. it shall be treated as a State not a party to the present Convention with
respect to trade in the particular species or parts or derivatives specified in such
reservation.
47. Id
48, Id art. XV(3). The provision states:
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Finally, a state may submit a written reservation as to an Appendix
III species at any time.49 The Convention does not require that
members give reasons for their reservations. 50 A member entering
any type of reservation is treated as a nonparty to that portion of the
Convention it opts out of with respect to trade in the species or part
or derivative concerned.5'
The effect of a reservation to an amendment upgrading a species
from Appendix 11 to Appendix I is unclear, however. No express
provision governs amendments that change a species' status.52 Arti-
cle XV(3) implies that reserving parties are to be treated as nonmem-
bers regarding those species.5 3 Hc-:ever, this interpretation, when
applied to an upgrading amendment, violates the Convention's pur-
pose. A party that has accepted Appendix II status for a species.
with its corresponding requirements, would be able to escape its
responsibility totally by reserving to an amendment upgrading a spe-
During the period of 90 days provided for... any Party may by notification in
writing to the Depositary Government make a reservation with respect to the
amendment. Until such reservation is withdrawn the Party shall be treated as a
State not a party to the present Convention with respect to trade in the species
concerned.
49. At any time after the communication of such [appendix Ill] list. any Party
may by notification in writing to the Depositary Government enter a reservation
with respect to any species or any parts or derivatives, and until such reservation
is withdrawn, the State shall be treated as a State not a Party to the present
Convention with respect to trade in the species or part or derivative concerned.
Id. art. XVI(2).
50. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Doc. 3.22. at 7 (report from the secretariat
on effects of reservations). Most states enter reservations for economic reasons. Id
Japan, for example, reserved as to the green. hawksbill. and olive ridley turtles because
of the local tortoiseshell industry. See notes 59 & 105 infra.
Canada and Switzerland. however, have entered reservations for noneconomic rea-
sons.
Canadian reservations on native species have been entered because the species
are not considered endangered or threatened and they are sufficiently protected
under domestic laws and enforcement measures. Canada also disagrees with the
listing of entire groups of species if they are not truly endangered and/or are not
common in international trade.
Letter from John B. Heppes, Administrator, Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species, Canadian Wildlife Service, to Stephen Yale-Loehr, at I (April 9.
1981) (on file at Cornell International Law Journal). Switzerland's 32 reservations result
from a disagreement with-the majority of the parties over the listings made at the San
Jos6 conference. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Doc. 3.22, at 7.
51. Convention, supra note I, arts. XV(3)..XVI(2). XXIII(3).
52. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
53. Convention, supra note 1, art. XV(3). Reservations to the saltwater crocodile. see
text accompanying note 74 infra, illustrate the uncertainty resulting from upgrading a
species. The French management authority claimed that its reservation to the Appendix
I listing placed trade in the species outside the Convention totally. Italy, Switzerland,
and West Germany, however, also reserving to the species' Appendix I status, continued
to accord Appendix II treatment. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2. Doc. 3.22, at 8-9.
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cies to the more restrictive Appendix I list. -14  Parties that enter a
reservation to a species elevated to Appendix I status should still be
obligated to extend at least Appendix II protection.
No record exists of the parties' intentions in including reserva-
tion clauses in the treaty. While the concept of allowing reservations
somewhat undercuts the conservationist goals of the Convention, the
following countervailing considerations may account for its pres-
ence. First, the IUCN may have incorporated the reservation
clauses in an effort to induce more participation in the Convention. 55
With so many parties, dissension over the listing and the status of
protected species would be inevitable,S The reservation clauses aim
to prevent conflict over these details from impeding general support
for the Convention. Second, the drafters recognized the existence of
legitimate trading interests in wildlife. The Convention generally
endeavors to control, not to eliminate, wildlife trade.57 The reserva-
tion clauses encourage greater participation by allowing states to
demonstrate general support for protecting endangered wildlife
while also protecting their own economic interests. Without such a
device, the Convention would require states to choose between total
protection and no protection at all.58 A country whose economy
depends largely on the processing or exporting of a protected species
54. The secretariat admits that. under a literal reading of the treaty language. such
rcserations result in a total dclisting of that species for the party entering the reserva-
tiuon. Id at 9. In view of the absurdity of this result. the secretariat called on reserving
parties to continue to give Appendix i protection to reserved species. Id
55. The ItJCN drafters of the Con,ention thought worldwide support for the Con-
vention was essential. The IUCN explained the permissive nature of the treaty provi-
sions: "The treaty will only be of consequence if a significant number of countries
adhere to it. including the major exporters and importers of wildlife." 3 IUCN BULL.
(new ser.) 1 (1972).
56. 'While the scientific-taxonomic classification work undertaken to improve the
appendices of the convention so far has demonstrated a high level of global consensus.
some issues are bound to be controversial due to socio-economic reasons." Sand. sulpra
note 2. at 58.
57. See. e.g.. 3 IUCN Bull. (new ser.) 1 (1972) ("[the Convention] will not halt all
unwarianted exploitation of wildlife but will strive towards rational use on a sustainable
.cield basis."); Sand. supra note 2. at 57 states:
IT]he convention seeks to draw a clearer line between illegal traffic and black
markets on one side, and legitimate trade in renewable natural resources on the-
other. A number of countries have well-managed programmes of wildlife con-
servation and utilisation. enabling them to harvest the excess yield as "interest"
[on) their resources without drawing on the capiti. To third world countries in
particular, these programmes may be important development factors and a sig-
nificant source of foreign exchange earnings on the world market.
Id
In striking this balance, however, the Convention does prohibit 'trade" in the larger
commercial sense for Appendix I specimens. See text accompanying note I8 supra.
58. Of course, states may bypass the Convention and attempt to protect endangered
species through domestic legislation. See notes 89-91 infra and accompanying text. The
insufficiency of such unilateral actions, however, prompted the need for the Convention
in the first place. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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would be reluctant to choose total protection. The threatened eco-
nomic interest necessary to block ratification need not be that large;
an effective lobby group with a strong interest in continuing wildlife
trade would suffice.5 9 Finally, the drafters probably envisioned only
occasional use of the clauses. One commentator has cited the public
nature of the reservations plus the "weight of international opinion"
as factors limiting use of the reservation clauses.6° Sporadic invoca-
tion of the reservation clauses by individual states has not thus far
diminished the Convention's overall effectiveness. 6' The Conven-
tion has focused attention on the problem of commercial exploita-
tion of endangered species. Moreover, the Convention's docu-
mentation requirements have increased confiscations of illegally
obtained or traded species62 and created an international store of
data on endangered species.
63
D. PROBLEMS WITH THE RESERVATION CLAUSES
Normally, a reservation fails to free a state of the Convention's
documentation requirements. While a state entering a reservation is
treated as a nonparty to the Convention for that species to which it
reserves, 64 Article X requires a nonparty to supply "comparable doc-
umentation" that "substantially conforms" to the Convention
requirements to permit trade of that species with a Convention mem-
ber.65 Thus, the agreement's requirements safeguard trade between
a reserving party and a nonreserving member.66
59. For example. the governor of Nagasaki delayed Japanese acceptance of the treaty
because of the local tortoiseshell industry, which employs 2500 people and grosses over
100 million dollars a year. [19801 INT'L ENVIR. RP. (BNA) (Current Rep.) 25. Thus. an
industry of merely local importance may be large enough to lobby for its own interests.
60. Legislative Development, supra note 7. at 1227. ,.
61. Sand, supra note 2, at 58 ("[despite some problems and loopholes]. [o]n the wfiole
the convention may be said to have demonstrated its practical viability during its
first four years of operation."). But see New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Inf. 3.2, at
2: -so long as non-members continue to outnumber the [members] of the Convention
and as long as the ranks of the former include unscrupulous traders in wildlife and forest
produce. the effectiveness of [the Convention] is bound to be partial." Id (speech-by
Rao Birenda Singh, Indian Union Minister for Agriculture, Rural Reconstruction & Irri-
gation 25 February 1981).
62. Sand, supra note 2, at 56. The author lists several major seizures in 1979 alone:
2.5 tons of fur pelts in Texas; 141 rhinoceros horns in West Germany, worth several
million deutschemarks; and 150,000 snake skins and 500 furs in India. 1d
63. The Convention requires parties to keep trade records, including the number and
types of permits granted, and to send the secretariat reports of trade information and
implementation measures taken to enforce the Convention. Convention, supra note 1,
art. VIII (6, 7).
64. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
65. Convention, supra note 1, art. X.
66. See also New Delhi Proceedings. supra note 2, Doc. 3.22, at 7 (banning commer-
cial trade in Appendix I specimens between nonreserving members and reserving states);
19811
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Nevertheless, reserving states may bypass the Convention
totally in two situations: trade between a reserving party and a non-
member, and trade between members that have entered identical
reservations (multiple reservations). In these instances, the result is
one of trade between two nonparties; therefore, Article X's protec-
tion fails to apply.
67
While both situations tend to undermine the Convention's effec-
tiveness,6x multiple reservations are particularly ominous. They
reopen the market for and encourage smuggling in Appendix I spe-
cies. States with a large enough share of the market entering
matched reservations could render nugatory the agreement's protec-
tion of a particular species.
Cooperation between importing and exporting states is neces-
sarv to fulfill the Convention's goal of protecting endangered spe-
cies." As more states enter reservations to the same species,
however, this cooperative effort collapses.70 The countries of origin
bear the burden of increased poaching and smuggling encouraged by
multiple reservations;7 these countries generally possess fewer
financial and technical resources to handle the problem.72 To date,
only crocodilians and sea turtles have suffered the consequences of
these two methods by which reserving states can bypass the conven-
tion.7 1 but the problem may well spread to other species.
II
EXAMPLES OF THE RESERVATION PROBLEM
Ironically, the same reasons that warrant protecting a species
under the Convention--scarcity. and commerial value-may well
subject that species to reservations. The discussion below develops
this issue and analyzes the effecti')eness of possible solutions. While
Id Plen. 3.9. at 4 (adopting draft resolution recommending strict requirements for par-
tics* acceptance of comparable documentation issued by nonparties (Com. 3.19)).
67. Id Do:, 3.22. at 7.
68, For the view that the Convention is generally effective, at least involving sporadic
indoidual reservations, see note 61 supra and accompanying text. But see'text accompa-
ning notes 78. 79 & 108 infra for examples of reservations by individual states that
adsersely affect endangered species.
69. New Delhi Proceedings. supra note 2. Inf. 3.8 (introductory remarks by M.K.
Dalvi. chairman of the third conference).
70. See New Delhi Proceedings. supra note 2. Doc. 3.22. at 7 ("Reservations inevita-
bly complicate the practical implementation of the Convention, and in particular make
border controls more difficult."). Joint reservations by France. Italy. Switzerland. and
West Germany as to the saltwater crocodile also are blocking the European Economic
Community's implementation of the Convention. Id
71. See Wasserman. sulpra note 26. at 364 ("The initiative of violating the provisions
of the Convention ... arises largely among the buyers").
72. See note 81 infra.
73. See te.t accompanying notes 74-82 & 101-10 tira.
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sea turtles and the saltwater crocodile illustrate the problems of res-
ervations most graphically, other species are also affected.
A. THE SALTWATER CROCODILE
1. The Problem
In 1979, under pressure from their luxury leather industries,
France, Italy, West Germany, and Switzerland jointly refused to
extend treaty protection to the saltwater crocodile (Crocodylus
porosus), an Appendix I species.74 The former three states process
over one million crocodile hides annually, which amount to sixty
percent of the international trade in that species. 75 The refusal of
these four nations to extend protection to the species, together with
Japan's reservation upon ratifying the Convention, 76 represents "'the
first time global protection of a highly endangered species [has been)
virtually undermined as a result of concerted action by industrial
lobbyists in importing countries.."7
7
In addition to the threat posed by multiple reservations, the spe-
cies is also threatened by trade between reserving states and Singa-
pore, a nonmember. Singapore is the principal supplier of saltwater
crocodile hides to Western Europe, yet has no native population of
the species. 78 The hides probably are obtained illegally in neighbor-
ing states.79 Because of the Convention's requirement that speci-
mens not be illegally obtained, these hides could not be traded if the
importing nations had not entered reservations.
Both multiple reservations and trade between a reserving state
and a nonmember have subjected the saltwater crocodile to exten-
sive poaching, and the species is now nearly extinct or reduced to
small populations throughout its wide range.80 The importing states
that have entered reservations tend to have more resources to
74. Sand. Luxury at any Cost, NATUROPA 59, 59 (No. 34/35, 1980) (Council of
Europe)-. 11980] INT'L ENViR. REP. (BNA) (Current Rep.) 25.
The species was upgraded from Appendix II to Appendix I at the 1979 conference. I
San Jo4 Proceedings, upra note 26, at 70-71.
75. Sand, note 74 supra. France processes about 500,000 hides a year, Italy, 400.000;
and West Germany, 250,000. 1d
76. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Doc. 3.22, at 1; 2 TRAFFIC (U.S.A.)
Newsletter 6 (Fall 1980). Japan is the world's fourth largest market for crocodile hides.
[1980) INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Current Rep.) 25. For discussion of the effect of reser-
vations entered upon treaty ratification, see notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
77. Sand, note 74 
supra.
78. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Doc. 3.22, at 9.
79. Id
80. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,074, 75,074 (1979) (final rule listing the saltwater crocodile as an
endangered species) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 17.11); 44 Fed. Reg. 43,442. 43,443
(1979). The species is native to Australia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, Bangladesh, India, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Id
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enforce the Convention. Both enforcement of conservation laws and
strict import and export controls are important aspects of the Con-
vention's protection. Exporting countries tend to lack the financial
resources nbcessary to prevent poaching and smuggling.8' Also, the
native habitat of the saltwater crocodile is wild swampland; this
makes game laws inherently difficult to enforce.
8 2
2. Responses to the Problem
The Convention neither prohibits nor limits the use of reserva-
tion clauses. Exporting states, however, may use the Convention's
permit requirements and the comparable documentation require-
ment of Article X to restrict reserving states from further endanger-
ing the saltwater crocodile.8 3 Enforcement officials of an exporting
state may refuse to grant export permits for specimens destined for a
reserving state on the grounds that such export would be detrimental
to the species' survival.A" Indeed, in the secretariat's view, the
exporting state must refuse to grant a permit in the above situation.85
Hence, the permit requirement may diminish some trade in crocodile
hides to reserving states. Because poaching and smuggling constitute
a significant source of skins, however, the permit certificate require-
ments fail to solve the whole problem." The permit system curtails
poaching only indirectly; traders in illegally obtained skins need
only surmount the additional burdens of forging import permits or
concealing goods.
8 7
In addition to poaching, other factors threaten the saltwater crocodile: expanding
human populations have destroyed many crocodilian habitats, and in some areas the
species is still killed as a man-eater. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,074, 75,074-75 (1979).
81. 44 Fed. Reg. 75.074, 75,075 (1979); Kaufman, Preserving Rare Species Is an Ironic
Success. N.Y. Times. March 8. 1981, at E20 (statement Qf Uruguayan delegate). see also
Grove, Wild Cargo: The Business of Smuggling Animals, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 287, 305
(March 1981) (djscussing problems of Thailand, Ecuador, and Kenya in financing con-
servation measures).
82. See R. WHITAKER, INTERIM REPORT ON THE STATUS AND BIOLOGY OF CROCO-
DiES IN PAPUA NEw GUINEA 2. 27 (U.N. F.A.0. Wildlife Division'. FO:DP/PNG/74/
029. Field Doc. No. 1 1980) (on file at Cornell International Law Journal); Bustard. A
Future/or Crocodiles, 10 ORYx 249, 249-50 (1970).
83.. See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text.
84. Convention, supra note 1. art. llI(2Xa). A state may deny an export permit to
Appendix I1 species destined for reserving states on the same grounds. Id art. IV(2)(a).
For an example of export permit suspension for Appendix 11 species due to fear that
trade would harm the species' survival, see [1978] INfL ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Current
Rep.) 393 (ban by the Endangered Species Scientific Authority on trade in four species).
85. -[N]o exporting Party may authorize commercial exports of Appendix I speci-
mens even though the importing Party might authorize the transaction on the basis of its
reservation." New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Doe. 3.22, at 7.
86. See [1980) INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Current Rep.) 25.
87. An import permit is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for trade in croco-
dile hides to reserving states. In addition to the import permit requirement, whether
forged or legally issued by the reserving state in compliance with article X's "comparable
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Article XIV allows individual states to adopt domestic measures
that are more rigid than those in the Convention.88 The United
States and Papua New Guinea are two states that have adopted
stringent legislation to protect the saltwater crocodile. Papua New
Guinea's laws prohibit trade in crocodile skins that measure more
than twenty inches belly-width. 89 The United States recently placed
the saltwater crocodile on the Endangered Species List of the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, 90 thereby prohibiting its trade and posses-
sion in the United States.9' Unfortunately, these unilateral actions
documentation" requirement. see notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text. the scientific
authority of the exporting state must determine that the export will not harm the survival
of the species. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
Forgery of permits is a major problem. The secretariat uncovered eight instances of
forgenes in 1980. including one instance involving trade worth 12 million dollars. [19801
INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Current Rep.) 556. At the 1981 New Delhi Conference, the
parties agreed to produce special security stamps to aid in identifying forged permits.
New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Plen. 3.9, at 6 (adopting Com. 3.9): id Com. 3.9
(Rev.).
?'8. Convention. supra note 1, art. XIV(I).
89. 44 Fed. Reg. 43,442. 43,443 (1979). The figure was based on estimates that a 20
inch belly measurement represents a saltwater crocodile of eight feet. Because the species
does not begin propagating until it attains a length of eight to nine feet, the law protects
the breeding population. 2 IUCN BULL. (new ser.) 97 (1969).
The extent of protection afforded by Papua New Guinea for the saltwater crocodile
persuaded the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service -to exempt that population from inclusion
on its Endangered Species list. 44 Fed. Reg. 43,442 (1979) 44 Fed. Reg. 75.074. 75.076
(1979) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 1-7.11). For a discussion of the Endangered Species
Act. see notes 90-95 infra and accompanying text.
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976), as amendedbv Endangered Species Act Amend-
ments of 1979. Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751; Authorization, Appropriations-
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225. Provisions of the Act
that implement the Convention include § 153 7 (e), establishing the administrative offices
mandated by the agreement. and § 1538(c), prohibiting trade in any specimens contrary
to the provisions of the Convention. See Convention, supra note I arts. VIll, IX. Sec-
tion 1537(e) has been repealed and reenactediin an altered form as 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a)
(Supp. 111 1979). Regulations under the Act implementing the Convention are codified
in 50 C.F.R. § 23 (1979).
91. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,074 (1979) (final rule) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 17.11). The
action exempted the Papua New Guinea population of Crocodlusporosus. Id For dis-
cussion of the control measures and breeding projects adopted by that state, see text
accompanying note 89 supra; notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text.
The Act directs that the Secretary of the Interior establish a list of all sp&ies deter-
mined by him or the Secretary of Commerce to be "endangered" and a separate list for
"'threatened" species. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 4(c)(1). 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1)
(1976). Both lists are contained in 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1979). The Act defines "endan-
gered species" as "any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a signifi-
cant portion of its range other than [certain insect pests]." d § 3(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6)
(Supp. 11 1978). "Threatened species" is defined as "any species which is likely to
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a signifi-
cant portion of its range." Id § 3(15), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (Supp. 11 1978). Section
4(a)(l) lists the five factors to be used in determining whether a species is endangered or
threatened. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(aX6) (1976). The Act prohibits the importing, exporting,
taking, selling, transporting, or offering for sale in the United States of any endangered
species. Id § 9(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1976). 50 C.F.R. § 17.21 (1979) implements the
trade prohibitions for species on the endangered list. For threatened species, however,
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play only a limited role in solving an international problem. 92
Papua New Guinea's ban on large skins protects adults, but leaves
the young crocodiles vulnerable to hunters. Policing problems hin-
der both approaches. For example, distinguishing a purse stitched
from a saltwater crocidile hide from a handbag made from an abun-
dant crocodile species is difficult.93 Accurate identification is crucial,
though, because of the differences in trade protection accorded to
various crocodile species.94 Imports of saltwater crocodile hides ille-
gally labelled as another unprotected species only hasten the for-
mer's decline. The Endangered Species Act attempts to minimize
the problem by incorporating in its Endangered Species List non-
threatened species that resemble those species already listed.95 This
measure reduces, but does not eliminate, policing problems. 96
In addition to protective domestic legislation, crocodile farms
the Scretary is directed only to issue such regulations as are necessary to conserve the
species Endangered Species Act of 1973. § 4(d). 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1976). See 50
C F R. § 17 31 (1979) for measures implementing this section. In addition to the trade
protection. inclusion of a species on ether the endangered or threatened list triggers the
a,alability of federal money to aid conservation and enforcement measures in foreign
countries Endangered Species Act of 1973. § 8(a). 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a) (1976).
92 Elimination of a domestic market only shifts the market elsewhere. Legislative
Deselopmcnt, supra note 7. at 1217: "[Trafficking in animals and their derivative parts
is a lucrative business and will be maintained as long as markets exist in the world where
such trade is not illegal." Id
93 Mohr, No Shortage of Custoters/or Wildlife, N.Y. Times. March 11. 1979. at E8.
See also 2 IUCN BULL. (new ser.) 163 (1971) (discussing the difficulty in identifying
species by their hide).
94. 50 C.F.R. § 23.23 (1979) lists I I crocodile species in Appendix I of the Conven-
tion. and all other species in Appendix 11. The saltwater crocodile is also in Appendix I.
5 ee note 74 supra. Similarly, the Endangered Species Act currently protects nine species
through inclusion on its -endangered species list: other species are not protected. 50
(F R § 17.11 (1979). There are 28 crocodtle species. PAPUA NEw GUINEA WILDLIFE
DivISiON. WILDLIFE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: MOITAKA CROCODILE FARM I (n.d.)
|hereinafter cited as MOITAKA REPORT] (on file at Cornell International Law Journal).
95. Endangered Species Act of 1973. § 4(e). 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e) (1976). The section
sets forth three criteria for determining similarity of appearance: (1) the nonthreatened
species so closely resembles the threatened or endangered species that enforcement per-
sonnel would have "substantial difficulty" distinguishing the two; (2) the effect of that
dificulty additionally threatens the endangered or threatened species; and (3) inclusion
of the unlisted species will "substantially facilitate the enforcement and further the policy
of the chapter." Id Implementing regulations are codified in 5"0 C.F.R. §§ 17.50-17.52
(1979). For example, the-regulations include certain populations of the American alliga-
tor (.4ligator missirsippiensir) as similar in appearance to other endangered or threatened
populations of the same species. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1979).
The Convention itself also attempts to handle the "look-alike" issue, at least for
Appendix 11 species. See Convention. supra note i, art. ll(2Xb).
96. The Parties currently are working on an identification manual to aid enforcement
personnel. New Delhi Proceedings. supra note 2, Plen. 3.4. at 1-2. i Plen. 3.6. at 3
(adopting resolution Com. 3.4. Annex extending the mandate of the identification man-
ual committee until the fourth meeting of the,conference of e parties); id Corn. 3.4.
Papua New Guinea resolved the identification problem by setting a size limit of 20
inches belly-width for both saltwater and freshwater crocodiles. 2 IUCN BULL. (new
ser.) 97 (1969).
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and ranches are another means of unilateral protection. 97 At these
farms and ranches, crocodiles are bred and raised in captivity or
semicaptivity. 98 Proponents of the projects put forth three related
goals: to prevent species extinction, to restore the wild population,
and to provide a source of skins for the leather industry. 99 The
projects are still new, however, and presently supply only a small
percentage of the international trade in crocodile hides.' 00
B. SEA TURTLES
1. The Problem
Although all species of sea turtles' 0 ' are highly endangered and
97. "Farming" and "ranching" carry distinctly different meanings. Ranching opera-
tions take young specimens from the wild and raise them in a controlled environment to
commercial size. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2. Com. 3.12, para. (a); C.K. Dodd.
Does Sea Turtle Aquaculture Benefit Conservation? 3 (1981) (unpublished paper on file
at Cornell International Law Journal); 2 IUCN BULL (new ser.) 163 (1971) <distinguish-
ing farms from rearing stations). These projects justify their procedures by pointing to
the large number of wild young that normally die before adulthood. For example. only
one out of ever.y 1,000 green turtle eggs may survive to adulthood. N.Y. Times. March I.
1981. at A41. col. 3.' Young crocodiles also suffer a high mortality rate. R. WHITAKER.
supra note 82, at 23 (saltwater crocodile hatchling mortality rate as high as 90% in estua-
nes); Bolton, Crocodile Farming in Papua New Guinea, 14 ORYX 365, 366 (1978);
MOITAKA REPORT, supra note 94, at 4.
By contrast, a farm is self-perptuating. raising specimens completely in captivity.
Dodd, supra, at 3: 2 IUCN BULL. (new ser.) 163 (1971). Successful captive breeding
farms are rare; the Papua New Guinea government's Moitaka crocodile farm is an excep-
tion. MOITAK,,, REPORT, supra note 94, at 5; 44 Fed. Reg. 43,442, 43,443 (1979). See
note 138 infra for discussion of the effect of this distinction on trade under the Conven-
tion.
The two states most often discussed in connection with crocodile farming or ranching
are Papua New Guinea and Thailand. See, e.g.. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,074 (1979) (Papua New
Guinea); 44 Fed. Reg. 43,442; 43,442-44 (1979) (Papua New Guina); 2 IUCN BULL. (new
ser.) 163 (1971) (Thailand). Crocodilian farms or ranches also exist in Botswana,
Zimbabwe, and the United States, and perhaps in Nicaragua and Cuba. Letter from C.
Kenneth Dodd, Jr., Office of Endangered Species, Fish & Wildlife Service, U.S. Dep't of
Interior, to Stephen Yale-Lohr, at 16 (April 6. 1981) (on file at CornelllnternationaLaw
Journal).
98. 44 Fed. Reg. 43,442, 43,443 (1979); 2 IUCN BULL. (new ser.) 163 (1971).
99. 44 Fed. Reg. 43,442. 43.443 (1979).
100. As of early 1979, 145 crocodile farms had been established in Papua New
Guinea, and hatchlings had been successfully reared for three years. Id The Thai farm
contains over 11,000 crocodiles. 2 IUCN BULL. (new ser.) 163 (1971). In 1970. 3.500
eggs were laid by breeding females on the farm. This figure is less than one percent of
the two niillion crocodilian hides traded annually, however. See Sand, note 74 smpra.
101. The exact number of sea turtle species is unknown. One authority lists eight
kinds: Dermochelys coriacea (leatherback turtle); Chelonia depressa (flatback turtle);
Caretta caretla (loggerhead turtle); Chelonia agassizi (Pacific black turtle); Lepidocheyvs
olivacea (Pacific or olive ridley turtle); Chelonia mydas (green turtlc-.-Lepidochelys kempi
(Mexican or Kemp's or Atlantic ridley turtle); and Eretmocheys imbricata (hawksbill
turtle). Carr, Great Reptiles, Great Enigmas, AUDUBON, March 1972, at 24-26. This Note
only discusses reservations as to the green, hawksbill, leatherback, and olive ridley spe-
cies.
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listed in Appendix 1,102 hundreds of thousands of them continue to
be killed for world trade each year. 0 3 Marine turtles are commer-
cially exploited for many reasons: their shells are carved for jewelry
and ornaments, the skin is tznned as leather, and the meat and eggs
are considered delicacies.1 4
France, Italy, Japan, and Surinam have entered reservations for
one or more sea turtle species.' 0 5 Japan's reservations are especially
discouraging, since Japan is one of the largest importers of sea turtle
products.106 The sea turtle suffers from the same two phenomena
that plague the saltwater crocodile: multiple reservations0 7 and
trade between reserving states and nonmembers. Large numbers of
sea turtles are killed in Mexico (a nonmember) each year, yet trade
between that country and reserving states remains outside the Con-
vention's scope.', In addition, sea turtle nesting places, like those of
102. 50 CF.R. § 23,23 (1979) currently lists all sea turtles except the flatback turtle
and the Australian population of the green turtle in Appendix 1: the parties at the 1981
New Delhi'Conference approved reclassifying both to Appendix I. See note 117 infra.
For a discussion of the threat to extinction that sea turtles face, see 43 Fed. Reg. 32,800.
32.803 (1978) ('if the factors causing declines in some species of sea turtles remain
unchanged, these sea turtles will be facing extinction.. in the foreseeable future."):see
also id at 32.804 (concluding that the Baja California population of green sea turtles
would be in danger of extinction within three years).
103. One authority estimates that, based on extrapolations from the poundage of tor-
toiseshell (mostly hawksbill) traded, between 150,000 and 360,000 turtles entered the
world market in 1976; 190.000 to 460.000 in 1977; and 250,000 to 590,000 in 1978. These
figures fail to include another approximately 200,000 olive ridlys taken by Mexico and
_quador each year for skin trade. Interviews with David Mack, (Feb. 25 & March 16,
1981); Letter from David Mack. supra'note 5, at 2.
104. 43 Fed. Reg. 32.800, 32.803 (1978); N.Y. Times. March 1, 1981. at A41, col. 3
(green turtle eggs considered a delicacy in Mexico); Grove. supra note 81. at 296. 310." "
105. France has reserved as to the green and hawksbill turtles; Italy. the green turtle:
Japan. the green. hawksbill, and olive ridly turtles; and Surinam, the green and leather-
back turtles. Reservations in force as of I January 1981, reprintedi) New Delhi Proceed-
ings. supra note 2. Doc. 3.22, at 3. Surinam's reservations became effective on February
15. 1981. Id at 1.5. Italy. while reserving only as to the green turtle, exports many olive
ndley turtles, in violation of the Convention's ban on commercial trade in Appendix I
species. TRAFFIC (U.S.A.). Memorandum to Sea Turtle Conservationists 3 (Feb. 12.
1981) [hereinafter cited as Sea Turtle Memo] (on file at Cornell International Law Jour-
na/I).
106. Sea Turtle Memo. supra note 105. at 2. In 1979. Japan imported 70,846 kilo-
grams of tortoiseshell, over 160.000 kilograms of turtle skins, and more than 20,000 kilo-
grams of turtle leather. Id A significant amount of Japan's 1980 imports came from
Convention parties. Id at 2-3. Trade with these states will probably decrease, however,
now that Japan is also a party and Article X's comparable documentation requirement
applies. -
107. The green and hawksbill turtles, in particular. suffer from multiple reservations.
Reservations in force as of I January 1981, reprinted i New Delhi Proceedings. supra
note 2. Doc. 3.22. at 3.
108. See 43 Fed. Reg. 32.800. 32,804 (1978). The annual Olive Ridley taken on
Mexico's Pacific coast is estimated to be 500,000 to 1.000,000 turtles. Sea Turtle Memo.
supra ioote 105, at 4: notes 103 supra & 110 hyfa. Mexico's trade with Japan is substan-
tial. For example. over 90 percent of the turtle leather imported into Japan in the first
nine months of 1980 came from Mexico. Sea Turtle Memo, supra note 105, at 5. Japan
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the saltwater crocodile, '1>9 are located in many states with little or no
wildlife management."' As a result of the above problems, there is
little effective trade regulation of sea turtles.
2 Responses to the Problem
Efforts to save the sea turtle are similar to those that states have
employed to protect the saltwater crocodile. On the national level,
the United States has placed six species of sea turtles on its Endan-
gered Species List"'I and has banned all imports of sea turtles." 12 In
addition, some ranching projects have begun to raise sea turtles."1
3
At least one conservation group is active in sea turtle preservation,
buying green turtle eggs that would otherwise be eaten and hatching
the eggs in protected areas."1
4
ratified the Convention in late 1980, but because it reserved as to three sea turtle species.
see note 105 supra, trade between the two countries may continue free of Article X's
comparable documentation requirement. Mexico participated in the Plenipotentiary
Conference, but has not yet ratified the Convention. 68-DEP'T STATE BULL. 613. 618
(1973); 43 Fed. Reg. 32,800, 32,807 (1978).
109. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
I10. For example, Ecuador, a member of the Convention since 1975, still exports
many Appendix I sea turtles. See Sea Turtle Memo, supra note 105, at 4. One authority
estimates that 200,000 olive ridleys were killed in Ecuador in 1978 and 1979. Letter from
David Mack. supra note 5, at 2.
Mexico's laws protect the green turtle, "but adequate enforcement is questionable." 43
Fed. Reg. 32,800, 32,807 (1978). The World Wildlife Fund spent over 5,000 dollars in
1980 to buy 268,000 green turtle eggs to prevent the eggs from being eaten as delicacies.
N.Y.-Times, March 1, 1981, at A41, col. 3.
1ll. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1979). The six s5pecies are the green, hawksbill, Atlantic rid-
Icy, leatherback. loggerhead, and olive ridley turtles. For a discussion of the protection
offered by the Endangered Species Act, see notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
112. The Endangered Species Act automatically prohibits imports of species listed as
endangered in 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1979). See note 91 supra. The hawksbill, Atlantic
ridlcy, leatherback, and portions of the green and olive ridley turtle populations have
been accorded endangered status. The Secretary has also imposed an import ban on
those species or populations of sea turtles listed as threatened in 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1979).
50 C.F.R. §§ 227.4, 227.71 (1979). See note 91 supra for a discussion of the Secretary's
authority to conserve threatened species.
113. Turtle ranches exist in the Grand Cayman Islands, Australia, Reunion Island.
the Seychelles, South Yemen, Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Dodd,
supra note 97, at 1. The Cayman Turtle Farm claims to be a true closed cycle farm.
Grove, supra note 81, at 310. At least one expert rejects that characterization, however.
Dodd, supra note 97, at 7.
In 1978, the Cayman Turtle Farm urged the U.S. government to exempt captive-bred
sea turtle specimens from the proposed import ban. 43 Fed. Reg. 32,800, 32,804 (1978).
The government denied the exception, stating that (1) such farms would only encourage
increased demand for sea turtle products and thereby stimulate poaching, (2) mariculture
operations such as the Cayman farm could not be monitored adequately, (3) such farms
would probably not provide much useful scientific information regarding breeding and
conservation, and (4) too little was known as to whether such farms could raise sea turtles
under a cloked cycle system. Id at 32,804-05. See generally Dodd, note 97 supra. For
the distinction between farms and ranches under the Convention, see note 139 infra.
114. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1981, at A41, coL 3.
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On the international level, Convention members are trying to
surmount smuggling and identification problems. As with the
saltwater crocodile,"" exporters of endangered sea turtle products
often falsely label the exportB as those of a nonendangered species.' 
6
At the 1981 New Delhi conference, the parties passed amendments
upgrading certain nonthreatened turtle species to Appendix I status.
This should curtail some of the identification problems."'
III
PROPOSALS
Proposals intended to curb overuse of the reservation clauses
should be considered in the context of the Convention's goals: con-
servation of endangered species, recognition of legitimate trade
interests in wildlife, and universal participation in the Conven-
tion.""a Universal participation in the Convention would minimize
the abuse involved in trade between reserving states and nonmem-
bers. Parties reserving as to certain species would have no choice but
to trade with other Convention members and hence would be forced
to issue comparable documentation under Article X."19 The follow-
ing proposals attempt to strike a balance between greater acceptance
of the treaty and species preservation.
A. LIMITING THE USE OF THE RESERVATION CLAUSES
This Note proposes two types of limitations on the use of reser-
vation clauses: the first limits the number of reservations that a party
may enter; the second restricts a reservation's duration. 120
115. See text accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
116 For example. "Italy [has) exported large quantities of sea tunic products of the
flatback sea turtle. . . . listing Mexico and Ecuador as its origin. South American river
turtle Podocnemus expansa, listing Mexico and Honduras as its origin, and Central
American nver turtle Dermaienrvsmawii. listing Mexico as its origin." Sea Turtle Memo.
supra note 105. at 3. Yet the lAatback sea turtle, listed in Appendix 11 before the 1981
conference, see note 117 infra. is found only in Australian waters. Id Similarly. the
South American river turtle, an Appendix 11 species, does not inhabit Mexico and Hon-
duras. the supposed countries of origin. Id Finally. Mexico exported more purported
Central American river turtle meat in 1979 and 1980 to the United States than biologists
believe exists in the entire world. Id
117. For example, until the 1981 conference, the entire green turtle species except the
Australian population was listed in Appendix 1. 50-C.F.R. § 23.23 (1979). The parties
adopted Australia's proposal to meliorate its population to avoid false documentation
problems. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,713, 20,714 (1981). The parties also upgraded the flatback
turtle to Appendix I. Id Finally, the parties partially protected the Central American
n'er turtle, prcviously unlisted, by placing it on the Appendix 11 list. Id
118. See notes 2 & 55-57 supra and'accompanying text.
119. Convention. supra note 1, art. X. Trade between Convention members reserving
as to the same species, however, is the exception. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
120 Of course, the two types of limitations could be combined.
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Limiting the number of reservations that a state can enter would
force states to make reservations concerning only those species most
important to their economies. However, if the number is too low, it
may discourage states from joining the Convention; if the number is
too high, it may present essentially the same problems as those that
exist under an unlimited reservation clause. Based on past practice,
a limit of five reservations per country should be sufficient' 2' and
serve to accommodate a state's economic interests as well as protect
its endangered species.
Yet, even if the Convention limits the number of reservations
each party can enter, countries may still enter reservations to the
same few species. This multiple reservation situation is likely to
exist where one particular species is important to the economies of
several countries.1
22
A second proposal involves limiting a reservation's duration. 23
The time constraint would create incentives for the states to develop
alternatives to the endangered species. If no substitute could be
found, industries using endangered species would at least have time
to reorganize so as to minimize the impact of an eventual reduction
or prohibition of trade in that species. The Convention's protection-
ist goals, as well as the state's ecpnomic interests, would be furthered
under this proposal since states could enter reservations for a limited
time and later honor the Convention as a whole.
With or without these limitations, all reservations should be
reviewed periodically. A change in market or manufacturing condi-
tions could alter the need for certain reservations. The parties' bien-
nial conference would be a logical time. for this review to take
place.' 24 In reviewing reservations, the parties should consider the
current status of the species involved, the economic harm to reserv-
ing states, and the availability of substitutes for the species. Review
at the conference would also focus public attention on the problem
since environmental organizations may participate.' 25
121. While most parties have entered no reservations, Switzerland has reserved as to
32 species: Canada. 13; Japan. 9; France, 7; South Africa, 5: the Soviet Union, 5: and
Italy. 5. Five other states have entered one or two reservations. Reservations in force as
of I January 1981. reprinted in New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Doc. 3.22. at 2-6.
For discussion of the reasons why states enter reservations, see note 50 supra.
122. For example, five countries have entered reservations to the saltwater crocodile.
See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text. For discussion of the problems caused by
matching reservations, see text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
123. Currently, a reservation continues indefinitely. A partymay withdraw a reserva-
tion at any time, however. Convention, supra note 1, arts. XV(3), XVI(2). XXIII(3).
124. See note 28 supra.
125. The Convention, supra note 1. art. XI(7), provides that "[any body or agency
technically qualified in protection, conservation or management of wild fauna and flora'
may send observers to the conference. Observers may participate, but may not vote. Id
19811
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These suggestions may be implemented either by a formal
amendment to the Convention or by an informal recommendation of
the parties. Both methods contain advantages and disadvantages.
Amending the Convention involves an unwieldy and time-consum-
ing procedure, requiring, among other things, an extraordinary
meeting of the parties.' 26 Furthermore, states have discretion in
accepting amendments,' 27 and those that have made great use of res-
ervation clauses are unlikely to ratify an amendment limiting that
option.' 28 The main advantage of the amendment process "s that it
would bind members who accept it and future members.
Recommendations appear to be the more politically acceptable
means for implementing methods to limit *the overuse of the reserva-
tion clauses.' 29 While the formal amendment approach may dis-
courage current nonparties from signing the Convention,
3
11
recommendations, because of their flexibility and lack of
enforcibility, can avoid this problem. The advisory nature of a rec-
ommendation will not necessarily doom the proposals included
therein to ineffectiveness since public opinion will provide some
pressure on the parties-to live up to the recommendations' stan-
dards.' 3 '
The recommendation approach is particularly well suited for
implementing the proposal for periodic review of reservations. At
the 1981 New Delhi conference, the parties passed a resolution
authorizing a ten-year review of the status of species listed in the
appendices. 3 2 A periodic review of reservation status is a natural
art XI(7)(b). Observers from 55 nongovernmental organizations participated at the 1979
conference of the parties, including such environmental groups as the Environmental
Defense Fund. IUCN. International Whaling Commission. Sierra Club. and World
Wildlife Fund. Fish & Wildlife Service, U.S. Dep't of Interior. Report of the U.S. Dele-
gation to the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
lnternational Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 68-70
(San Jost, Costa Rica. March 19-30, 1979). Environmentalists' presence at meetings will
provide pressure for a thorough review of the reservation clauses.
126. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
127. 'An amendment shall enter into forcefor the Parties which have accepit:d it 60
days after two-thirds of the Parties have deposited an instrument of acceptance of the
amendment with the Depositary Government." Convention, supra note 1. art. XVII(3)
(emphasis added).
128. A proposal to eliminate the reservation clauses would probably be much less
successful than this Notc's more moderate suggestion. The considerations that first led to
including the clauses in the Convention render deletion unlikely. See text accompanying
notes 55-63 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
130. The Convention prohibits general reservations. Convention. supra note I. art.
XXIII(l). Only special reservations complying with the reservation clauses of articles
XV. XVI. and XXIII are allowed. Thus. states ratifying the Convention after a formal
amendment limiting the use of reservations would be bound by those limitations.
131. See also text accompanying notes 167-78 infra.
132. Interviews with David Mack. note 103 supra.
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analog. If adopted, such a recommendation would focus public
attention on the problem without unduly threatening the parties.'33
B. FARMING AND RANCHING'
34
States are presently making efforts to raise certain endangered
species in captivity, for trade purposes as well as to restock the wild
population. The Papua New Guinea crocodile projects exemplify
this effort.' 5 Carefully managed farms and ranches have several
advantages. Besides encouraging the suirvival of endangered spe-
cies, ' 6 such projects are in the economic interest of exporting states.
As animal and plant specimens increase in value, countries of origin
may take greater care to protect the species from extinction. Farms
and ranches may provide steadier and ecologically sounder employ-
ment for the local population. 37 In addition, projects may assuage
importing states' concerns by providing a steady source of supply.
Farms and ranches also serve to encourage participation in the
Convention. Article VII(4) allows commercial trade in Appendix I
animal species that have been bred in captivity.' 3  In addition, a
recommendation adopted at the 1981 conference allows commercial
trade in a nation's native population of an Appendix I species, if the
parties jointly agree that ranches in that state meet criteria to ensure
133 While such a recommendation would not bind a party to withdraw a reservation
if the review fouid it to be unnecessary or unsound, the process would bring public
pressure to bear on the reserving party. Again. the presence of environmental and con-
servation groups as observers at the conference would instire rigorous scrutiny. See note
125 supra.
134. For a discussion of the critical distinction between farming and ranching, see
note 97 supra.
135. See 44 Fed. Reg. 43.442. 43.443 (1979) (discussing objectives of Papua New
Guinea Crocodile Project).
136. Ranching projects especially must be carefully managed to insure survival.
Papua New Guinea's program appears to work both because local ranches are carefully
supervised and because of the existence of laws that protect the adult breeding popula-
tion. See notes 89 & 98-100 supra and accompanying text.
137. I.U.C.N /S.S.C. CROCODILE SPECIALIST GROUP FOURTH WORKING MEETING.
JOINT REPORT OF THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA/FAO PROJECT "ASSISTANCE TO Till: CROC-
ODILE SKIN INDUSTRY" I (1978) [hereinafter cited as JOINT REPORT] (on file at Cornell
International Law Journal).
138. Convention, upra note 1, art. VII(4). The provision provides that such speci-
mens are to be ireaited as Appendix II specimens. Id
The meaning of this exception was an issue at the 1971 conference of the parties. The
U.S. delegation introduced a definition that would effectively limit the exception to
closed cycle operations. The parties accepted the recommendation. I San Jost Proceed-
ings, supra note 26, at 49-50 (Conf. 2.12: Specimens Bred in Captivity or Artificially
Propagated). The parties, however, did not completely reject the idea of extending the
exception to ranching. They referred the issue to the secretariat, who formed an adhoc
committee on ranching to study the issue. See New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2,
Doc. 3.13, Annex I. For a discussion of the committee's recommendations and the
results reached at the 1981 conference, see note 141 infra and accompanying text.
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species preservation. 39 These exceptions provide an incentive for
countries of origin to ratify the Convention.140
The farming approach is not a panacea, however, for the agree-
ment's ills. First, farms and ranches are feasible for only a limited
number of species.' 4 ' Second, local officials must manage such
projects very carefully to avoid further threats to the world popula-
tion of the species involved. Ranches, which continually replenish
their stock from the wild, represent the greatest danger. 142 Even
farms, however, must start with specimens from the wild Highly
endangered species may be further endangered by initial stocking.
139 The recommendation downgrades a nation's native population of an Appendix I
%pccies to Appendix 11. if, in the judgmcnt of the parties, ranching operations in that state
will not further endanger the local population or the species as a whole. New Delhi
Proceedings. supra note 2, Com. 3.12 (adopted in id Plen. 3.8. at 2-3): id Com. 3.5. at 2.
The parties are to consider numerous factors in evaluating a proposed transfer: the tak-
ing from the wild must have no significant detrimental impact on wild populations; ade-
quate identification is necessary to distinguish readily native population specimens from
other speciment- the management authority of the state must make its records available
to the secretariat to assure that adequate safeguards are bqing taken: and. most impor-
tant. the ranching operations -must be primarily beneficial to the conservation of the
local population." Id Corn. 3.12, paras. (b)(i & ii). (c) (i & vi).
As adopted. the recommendation modified the ranching committee's original proposal
to accept trade only in the ranched specimens of a local population. Id Doc. 3.13.
Annex 4. at I (Draft Resolution of the Conference of the Parties: Ranching of Appendix
I Animals). The parties felt that expansion to include the entire population would not be
detrmental. because of the expectation that the parties would require appropriate safe-
guards to protect the local population and the species. Id Com. 3.5. at 2.
140. For example. Surinam stated that it entered a reservation to the green turtle
because it might develop ranching operations. Id Inf. 3.9. at I (Statement of Suriname
on its Accession to CITES). It also promised to withdraw its reservation when the parties
agreed on a way to allow countries to establish ranching as a conservation method. Id
The inclusion of entire national-populations of ranched species on Appendix II .reflects
this concern, the recommendation is designed to encourage countries who had entered
reservations because of local ranching operations to withdraw those reservations. Id
Com 3.5. at I
141. The chairman of the ranching committee listed the following few species as possi-
bly amenable to ranching: crocodiles, turtles, and perhaps some snakes, lizards.
amphibians. fish: and insects. Id Plen. 3.4. at 3. In addition, some experts question the
biological and economic bases of already existing ranches. See. e.g.. Ehrenfeld. Conserv-
ing 'the Edible Sea Turtle: Can Mariculture Help.. 62 AM. SCIENTIST 23. 24-31 (1974);
Dodd, supra note 97. at 3-14. See also note 142 infra.
142. For example, one expert severely criticizes sea turtle ranching theory and prac-
tice. stating that commercial aquacultural operations "are based on false premises about
the extent of biological knowledge of the species and about ihe applicability of the maxi-
mum sustainable yield concept," and that the assumption that the species' survival rate
will increase by collecting "doomed" eggs, raising the hatchlings past the critical mortal-
ity period, and then releasing a portion back to the wild. is not supported in fact. Dodd.
supra note 97. at 8, 14. The author concludes that, because aqua ulture could stimulate
the market, lead to a proliferation of projects with "no conservation outlook," and
"spawn ill-conceived yet -well publicized 'conservation' activities"' that could mislead the
consuming public into believing that sea turtles are recovering significantly, "sea turtle
aquaculture can only be considered a threat to the survival of these endangered species."
ld at 14. But see New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Doc. 3.13, Annex 2 (report of the
ranching committee), para. 34, for a discussion of the advantages of ranching.
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONVENTION
To minimize this impact, farms must start with smaller populations,
postponing .ventual profits.
A third and related problem is the issue of subsidies. It takes,
years to raise specimens to commercial size. 43 Thus, farms and
ranches require, subsidies in their early years.'" To alleviate this
problem, countries of origin should be encouraged to tax wildlife
specimens exported under the Convention. 45 Funds generated by
such a tax could be used to finance farms, ranches, and general con-
servation measures.'46 This approach would encourage exporters to
bring as much wildlife trade as possible within the Convention to
increase revenues from the tax. The tax, ultimately borne by the
consumer, would also more accurately reflect the true costs of wild-
life trade.
Fourth, distinguishing between two specimens of the same spe-
cies, one captive-bred and the other wild, is presently impossible. 47
The first step necessary in dealing with this problem is strict adher-
ence to the Convention's documentation requirements. 48 Another
possible step would be to use special stamps to aid in identifying
143. Saltwater crocodiles must be raised about three years to reach commercial size.
and the species does not begin to breed until 10 to 15 years old. MOITAKA REPORT. Supra
note 94, at 4; R. WHITAKER, supra note 82, at 22. Sea turtles take five to seven years to
mature and only reproduce every two to four years. Ehrenfeld. supra note 141, at 24. 28.
144. For example, Papua New Guinea's crocodile ranches and farms currently receive
monetary and technical support from their government and the United Nations. R.
WHITAKERsupra note 82. at 1; JOINT REPORT, supra note 137, at 4; 44 Fed. Reg. 43.442.
43,443 (1979). The Cayman Turtle Farm exemplifies the high costs of ranching. The
company has reportedly spent over 17 million dollars to date, and authorities still debate
whether it represents a true closed cycle operation. Dodd, supra note 97, at 7.
145. The Papua New Guinea government already imposes a tax on crocodile skin
exports. JoiNT REPORT, supra note 137, at 9. To be most effective and least cumbersome
administratively, the tax should be a percentage of the export price rather than a set
amount per specimen.
146. The income could help overcome the "reluctance on the part of governments to
spend money on wildlife." Grove, supra note 81, at 305 (quoting Indian wildlife official).
For example, income from the tax would allow mcre conservationists and park guards to
be hired and trained. Id (lack of funding for guards in Ecuador and Thailand).
147. Dodd, supra note 97, at 9-10. The distinction is crucial, however, because of the
Convention's trade allowance for Appendix I species bred in captivity. See text accom-
panying note 138 supra.
The parties at the 1981 conference attempted to deal with the identification problem, at
least for ranching, by incorporating a requirement that ranched products be "adequately
identified" so that they are "readily distinguish[able] from products of Appendix I popu-
lations." New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2, Coin. 3.12, para. (b)(ii). See also id Doc.
3.13, Annex 2, para. 36 (report of the ranching committee recommending that an indeli-
ble mark be used to identify ranched products). %
148. The Convention's general documentation requirements arc set forth in article VI.
Convention, supra note 1, art. VI. While an effective permit system for raw specimens is
difficult enough to devise and enforce, the task becomes impossible after specimens are
cut and processed into finished goods. See Elephants: Hearings on H.R. 4685 Before the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 107 (1979)
(statement of Ian Parker) [hereinafter cited as "Elephant Hearings].
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forged permits. 
49
Finally, critics claim that farming and ranching projects are
counterproductive in that they stimulate the current market and
thereby encourage increased poaching. 50 These critics feel that the
only effective protection for endangered species is to eliminate the
market.''
In sum, farming and ranching can serve to preserve species and
encourage wider participation in the Convention, thus partially
curbing one aspect of the reservation clause problem: trade between
reserving states and nonmembers. 52 To achieve those goals, how-
ever, the costs of farming and ranching must be less than the costs
associated with poaching and smuggling.'5 3 Factors such as the
amenability of the species to farming or ranching, the number of
specimens able to be produced, the cost per specimen, the added
demand generated by such operations, and identification problems
must be carefully considered in deciding whether to pursue farming
and ranching. Such projects should be encouraged only to the extent
that they actually aid conservation as well as trade.' -4
C. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
States generally enter reservations for economic reasons. 55
Consuming states should use their market position to exert pressure
on reserving exporters and'processors to withdraw their reservations.
The Convention allows member states to adopt stricter regulations
than those provided by the treaty. 5 6 Individual states can thereby
take the initiative to exclude products coming from reserving coun-
tries.15 A consuming state with a large percentage of the world mar-
ket in a particular finished wildlife product could potentially be
quite influential. A "counter cartel" of consuming states would be
even more effective. In addition to the Convention's prohibition
149 See note 87'.wupra.
150. Carr.supra note 101. at 34; Ehrcnfeid. supra note 141, at 29; Dodd. supra note 97.
at 4;see 43 Fed. Reg. 32.800. 32,804 (1978); Grove. supra note 81. at 305. 310. 313. 314.
151. See. e.g.. Bolton.supra note 97. at 369 (Editor's note) Carr. supra note 101, at 34;
Dodd. supra note 97. at 14.
152. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
153. See Ehrenfeld, supra note 141. at 30.
154. Farming is preferred to ranching because of the latter's dangerous reliance on
wild populations for its stock, which may further contribute to a species' extinction. The
parties addressed that concern at the 1981 conference by mandating that ranching opera-
tions be ':primarIy beneficial to the conservation of the local population" as one require-
ment before ranched products of Appendix I species may be traded commercially. New
Delhi Proceedings, supra note 2. Com. 3.12. para. (b)(i) (emphasis added).
155. See note 50nqpra.
156. Convention, .rura note 1. art. XIV(I).
157. The United States has not adopted this approach expressly, but its import ban on
any endangered species accomplishes the same result. See note 91 supra.
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against imports of Appendix I specimens,'"" major consuming states
could increase economic pressure on reserving parties by extending
the import ban to related nonendangered species as well.' 59 Wildlife
processing industries in reserving countries would then find it in
their economic interest to have their governments withdraw the res-
ervations and allow restricted trade under the Convention' 60 rather
than suffer a total loss of trade irt he species involved.
Two conditions must be met in order to effectuate this proposal.
First, a significant portion of the consuming market must join in the
ban. Lost trade due to the boycott should be greater than the differ-
ence between present trade outside the Convention and trade under
the Convention's restrictions for a processing industry to prefer the
latter alternative. This amount will vary from species to species,
depending on the extent of available substitutes and specimens bred
in captivity.' 6 ' Second, a substantial lack of identity between the
producing and consuming countries is necessary. A trade ban by
outside states will be ineffective against a producing industry that
either already sells most of its finished products from the reserved
species in its domestic market or can substitute the domestic market
for its lost exports.
62
Import bans reflect a consumer state's desire not to be responsi-
ble for a species' extinction. Exporting states, however, may feel that
such unilateral bans fail to take into account the legitimate interests
of the exporting state. 63 Total import bans may, for example, con-
flict with an exporting state's desire to develop farming projects. '
64
158. See New Delhi Proceedings. supra note 2. Doc. 3.22. at 7 ("No. . . Party may
accept Appendix I specimens from a Party having reserved on the species concerned.").
159. For example, the ban should extend to reservations to all crocodile and alligator
species because of the problem in distinguishing hides of an endangered crocodile species
from those of a nonprotected species. See notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text.
160. Processors could still trade in nonthreatened species, Appendix II species. see text
accompanying note 22 supra, and specimens bred in captivity, see note 138 supra ind
accompanying text. For example, the Convention currently allows trade in 16 of the 28
crocodilian species. See note 94 supra. Initially, however, the supply will be restricted,
especially if few farms exist.
161. 1d
162, Here, a boycott by local consumers against local processors and retailers would
be necessary to substitute for an external trade ban. Given the current decline in social
pressure to avoid use of wildlife products, an effective internal consumer boycott may be
difficult to accomplish. See Mohr, note 93 supra.
163. In testimony before a congressional committee considering a proposed import
ban on ivory trade, one authority urged. Congress not to take any action without first
consulting African governments. Elephait Hearings supra note 148, at 80 (statement of
Dr. lain Douglas-Haamilton). see also id at 104 (statement of Ian Parker urging Congress
to work through the Convention rather than take unilateral action that, because of igno-
rance, could "produce a countereffect to that which it is hoped to do.").
164. In an analogous situation, the U.S. government rejected a commercial maricul-
ture operation's request for an exemption from the U.S. trade ban on sea turtles. See
1981)
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These competing interests must be balanced, yet without discourag-
ing cooperation under the treaty.
D. PUBLIC OPINION
A similar and complementary solution to the economic pressure
proposal is the use of adverse publicity.1'6
At the 1981 conference, the parties decided to require members
to include trade figures in reserved species in their annual reports.'"'
With this trade data, conservationists will be better equipped to use
public pressure in persuading statesn 7 and industrie.I,," to take an
official stand against wildlife exploitation. Such pressure could be
particularly effective in the United States and Europe. where envi-
ronmental groups are active. Public opinion can be especially influ-
ential at the parties' biennial conferences, because of the
Convention's unusual rules that allow qualified nongovernmental
observers to participate in debates and proceedings. 169 At the 1979
San Jos6. Costa Rica Conference, these observers were credited with
playing a role in obtaining the approval of restrictions on whale
trade and defeating proposals by various states to ease restrictions on
certain species of wldlife.1' 1
CONCLUSION
Multiple use of the Convention's reservation clauses remains
the major obstacle to full effectuation of the agreement. The threats
to the saltwater crocodile and sea turtles illustrate the power of eco-
note 113 jupra While no c,,idencc existed linking the commercial operation with its
go'. rnment. such a conflict may arise in the future
165 *'Perhaps the most important aspect of enforcement. still largel, neglected, is
public information as a means to induce ,,oluntarv compliance-"" Sand. supra note 2. at
,X
166. Letter from Da'.id Mack. sipra note 5.
167 Public outrage over abuses in the i,,or trade recentl,. con'.inced Congress to con-
sider a six-month moratorium on ivory imports into the United States. H.R. 4685. 96th
Cong. Ist Sess § 4 (1979). reprintedin Flephant Hearrngs. supra note 148. at 4-5. See id
at S I ("the c phant's decline] has no%% become a great emotional issue in the United
States . wo congressmen on the committee) received .. approximately 4.000 let-
tcrs and cards ranging from 9- and 10-year-old schoolchildren to 75-vear-old grandmoth-
ers "). Editor's note. NAT'L GEOaRAPIIIC 285 (March 1981) (stating that. in response to
an earlier article about the elephant's decline, thousands cif readers sent contributions to
the World Wildlife Fund's special elephant collection, including a 102,000 dollar air-
plane) Despite this pressure. the bill died in the Senate. perhaps because of testimony
that. in light of the United States' small portion of the world ivon' market, unilateral
action would be ineffective. See Elephant Hearings. supra note 148. at 54-55. 104. 115.
168. *In most developed countres public pressure has forced spotied-cat furs off shop
displays and. often, off the streets. Major showrooms in Paris have agreed to stop creat-
ing coats made from endangered species." Grove. supra 81. at 305.
169. See note 125 supra.
170. N.Y. Times. Apr. 2. 1979 at DIO. col. I.
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nomics to ride roughshod over preservation. Proposals to limit use
of the Convention's reservation clauses, to encourage farming, and
to put pressure on reserving countries through economic sanctions
and public opinion have been evaluated for their effectiveness in bal-
ancing universal participation in the agreement, conservation, and
legitimate trade interests. Each proposal contains some flaws: no
single suggestion is likely to prevent overuse of the reservation
clauses. This complex problem demands a multifaceted solution.
Convention members and concerned individuals and groups should
work on all fronts to curb abuse of the reservation clauses.
G'rneth G. Stewart

